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ABSTRACT 
 
Fibre sourcing is a critical strategic question for all sawmills and pulpmills, but the 
degree of supply integration though long-term contracts and forest ownership varies 
widely. The purpose of this research was to investigate the extent to which forest-mill 
integration patterns can be explained by the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory.  
 
TCE theory holds that organizations will choose transaction governance forms that 
minimize transaction costs. The TCE factors expected to influence that choice can be 
grouped into three categories; transaction frequency, market uncertainty, and asset 
specificity. Interviews with various industry representatives suggested that factors from 
all three categories are relevant to the question of forest-mill integration.  
 
A survey was conducted of mills in New Zealand and Sweden, providing data on their 
supply mix and various TCE factors. Of an estimated population of approximately 450 
mills, 136 mills were sampled and 88 responded to the survey. Fractional logit models 
were developed to explore the factors that may influence the integration decision.  
 
Considerable evidence was found for the importance of TCE factors in driving fibre 
supply integration. The evidence was strongest for factors related to asset specificity, 
including forest owner concentration and the specificity of a mill’s fibre requirements. 
Transaction frequency appears less important; while integration was found to be 
significantly associated with the number of mills an organisation has within the supply 
basin, the influence of mill capacity was found to vary. There was weak evidence for 
the importance of uncertainty, and perhaps only through the impact of forest owner 
concentration on market conduct.  
 
Integration was found significantly higher for pulpmills than sawmills, and higher in 
Sweden than in New Zealand. The latter result is difficult to explain by TCE theory, 
and suggests that non-TCE factors play a significant role. Survey responses also 
indicated that non-TCE factors are important.  Further research is required to enlarge 
the sample size and better understand the role of TCE factors in forest-mill integration. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Fibre sourcing is a critical strategic question for sawmills and pulpmills globally, 
because fibre represents a very large share of their production costs. Historically, the 
larger players have tended to own forests to secure fibre supply. Separation of forest 
and mill asset ownership is now becoming more common in several parts of the world. 
Surprisingly few studies have investigated the drivers of forest-mill integration 
decisions.  
 
The theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) has been found very powerful in 
explaining diverse integration questions. TCE theory holds that exchange agreements 
must be governed, and that the exchanging parties will try to adopt governance forms 
that minimise transaction costs. Possible governance forms span the range between 
complete reliance on the market to full internalization of the transaction (integration), 
where intermediate forms often involve some form of contracting. 
 
The following sections provide an introduction to the question of forest-mill 
integration, outlines prior research on the topic, and presents the research objective. 
 
  
1.1 Research objective 
 
The objective of this research was to test TCE theory with respect to forest-mill 
integration in New Zealand and Sweden. There has been concern within the New 
Zealand forest industry that a lack of investment in downstream processing may be due 
to low levels of consolidation and integration. Sweden provides a good comparison in 
this respect, because it has a very well-developed forest products sector. In addition, the 
trend towards forest and mill asset separation is relatively new in both countries, and 
the question of whether this development is driven by concerns for economic efficiency 
is highly interesting. 
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1.2 Forest-mill integration 
 
Fibre is the key input factor for sawmills and pulpmills. Sawlogs typically represent 60-
80% of sawmill’s operating costs1 (Poyry, 2003 and Poyry, 2005). Fibre, usually in the 
form of pulplogs or wood chips, represents 40-60% of production costs for bleached 
kraft pulp, and is the single largest cost factor (Poyry, 2005 and NZIER, 2001). For this 
reason, procurement of fibre is a very important part of these businesses’ strategy and 
operations. Access to reliable and low-cost fibre can represent an enormous 
competitive advantage.  
 
In practice, mills can source fibre from their own forests, through supply contracts, or 
from the open market. Most mills meet their fibre needs through a combination of all 
three sources, but the relative share varies greatly. 
 
Historically, the larger players in the world’s forest-products economies (including 
North America, Scandinavia and Australasia) have tended to own forest for much of 
their fibre needs. The reasons for this are many and will be discussed in detail, but 
security of supply is clearly an important factor, given the continuous manufacture 
process and high capital intensity of the processing industry.  
 
However, over the last few decades there has been a trend towards separate ownership 
of forest and downstream assets. This started in the US in the 1970s, and most of the 
forest products companies there have now sold their forest assets; of the largest 10 
forest owners in the US, only two have downstream operations2. This trend has even 
been apparent in Scandinavia and Australasia, although more recently and to a lesser 
extent3. 
                                                 
1 Including fibre, labour , energy, and delivery, but excluding capital cost and overhead 
2 Weyerhaeuser and Temple Inland 
3 Some examples of this are a) Stora Enso’s sale of their Finnish forest assets to a group of investors in 
2002; the first securitisation of forestland in Europe, forming the company Tornator, b) Korsnäs and 
Stora Enso’s sale of their Swedish forest assets in 2004 to Bergvik Skog, c) Carter Holt Harvey’s sale of 
its New Zealand forests to Rayonier and Deutsche Bank in 2005, and Hancock in 2006, d) Fletcher 
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1.3 Prior research 
 
Research on the factors that influence the forest-mill integration decision has focused 
on the North American industry, and few have considered TCE. According to Binkley 
et al. (1996), the sale of forest assets by forest product companies in the US was due to 
two independent forces: 
 
1. Changes in the regulation of the pension and life insurance industry encouraged 
diversification of investments, and institutional investors became interested in 
forest assets. 
2. Forest products companies started reassessing the benefits of forest ownership. 
Many concluded that forest assets were undervalued by the stock market and 
should be divested. At the same time, improvements in harvesting and transport 
efficiency meant that supply basins were enlarged, increasing security of 
supply. 
 
Yin et al. (2000) studied the effect of forest ownership on operating decisions for a 
paperboard mill. They presented three key features of the pulp and paper industry, 
which make integration attractive: the industry has (1) high capital intensity, and (2) a 
high degree of asset specificity4, which together yield a lack of flexibility and 
vulnerability to the (3) highly cyclical markets. These factors are all central to TCE 
theory, but the objective of this research was not to test how they influence integration 
decisions. Rather, they analysed the value of integration to an organisation in terms of 
increased stability of costs and revenues.  
 
Yin et al. modelled the operating decisions (entry, exit, mothballing, and reactivation) 
for a hypothetical linerboard mill in the U.S., with respect to market linerboard prices 
and timberland ownership. The model showed that there are threshold prices for each 
                                                                                                                                              
Challenge’s sale of its New Zealand forests in 2003 to different investors including Harvard University, 
Prudential Timber, Kiwi Forests Group, and Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan 
4 Reflected in the fraction of asset’s value that would be lost if it were excluded from it’s major use 
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decision, and that these thresholds are lower when the mill is integrated, assuming a 
cost-based transfer price for forest fibre. The authors suggest that integration creates 
supply flexibility and more stable cash-flows, thereby allowing better long-term 
investment decisions. It may also be argued that the transfer of profits from a forestry 
operation to a paper operation (which might not be value-creating on its own) does not 
maximise the value of the forest asset, and may not be considered a viable reason for 
integration by all investors. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that TCE could be relevant to the forest integration 
decision. In their study of vertical integration in the Canadian forest products industry, 
Globermann and Schwindt (1986) concluded that transactional considerations are 
important determinants of governance structure. Their approach was to examine the 
structure of companies’ entire value chains, searching for transactions that are 
inconsistent with TCE theory. They found very few anomalies. All but one of the 
largest 30 companies owned timberland cutting rights, and they attributed this to 
transaction costs.  
 
Globermann and Schwindt (1986) suggested that sawmills and pulpmills are dedicated 
to a specific forest basin defined by the economic transport radius for logs, because 
mills are not easily relocated (salvage values are low relative to the cost of initial 
construction). They argue that forests are not as dependent on a particular mill, because 
standing forest is not a wasted asset. In the event of no transaction, forest owners have 
the alternative of letting the forest continue to grow. Mills that need a continuous 
supply of logs are vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour from independent suppliers, 
and this encourages integration.   
 
However, the Canadian case is somewhat special; 93% of forestlands in Canada are 
state-owned, and it is unclear whether the high level of integration is due to TCE 
factors or the institutional framework imposed by the government. Cutting rights are 
assigned in accordance to the provincial forest acts. Canadian forest products 
companies that want to gain rights to public timber have needed to build or operate a 
mill, and the timber rights are tied to this mill through an appurtence agreement.  
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Figure 1: Forest ownership in Sweden and New Zealand 
 
* Plantation forests only  
 
Source: NZFOA/WPA/MAF, “NZ Forest Industry Facts and Figures”, 2007; Swedish Forest Agency, “Yearbook of Forestry”, 
2007 
 
In contrast, forest-mill integration in Sweden and New Zealand is very much an open 
question, because commercial forest ownership is largely private and much more 
fragmented (refer to Figure 1). These countries provide interesting case studies for the 
role of TCE in forest integration. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theory of transaction cost economics is well developed, by Williamson (1975; 
1979), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and 
Moore (1990) among others. It has been applied to a wide range of disciplines where 
problems of contracting and economic organisation emerge, including economics and 
business, law and public policy (Boerner and Macher, 2001). It has also become widely 
applied in business strategy (Stuckey and White, 1993). 
 
The following section summarises the theoretical framework used in this research, 
including an introduction to TCE theory, support for the theory, and challenges in TCE 
research.  
 
2.1 Introduction to TCE theory  
 
In short, TCE theory holds that exchange agreements must be governed, and that the 
exchanging parties will try to adopt governance forms that minimise transaction costs. 
Often the choice of governance form can be simplified to the “make versus buy” 
decision, meaning the choice between market and hierarchical governance (Sykuta, 
2005). However, a range of intermediate solutions can exist between buying on the spot 
market and full integration, including long-term contracts, strategic alliances, and joint 
ventures (Williamson, 1991 and Menard, 2004).   
 
A key determinant of transaction costs is the risk of hold-up. This is opportunistic 
behaviour by one party in the transaction to their own advantage, and to the 
disadvantage of the other party. Hold-up can increase transaction costs in several ways: 
1. The risk of hold-up actually occurring, and the subsequent losses incurred 
2. Payment of a premium to discourage opportunism 
3. The cost of writing, monitoring, and enforcing long-term, complex contracts 
 
Two key factors determining the risk of hold-up are the level of asset specificity and the 
level of uncertainty (Stucky and White, 1993).  
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Asset specificity impacts the size of “appropriable quasi-rents”; the potential gain 
available through the hold-up. In simple terms, these rents are equal to the difference 
between the value of the agreed transaction, and the value of next best alternative 
(Klein et al., 1978). For example, if a buyer’s asset is highly specific to a particular 
input, the asset’s value would be greatly diminished if the supply of that input was 
disrupted. Therefore the appropriable quasi-rents are large, and the supplier could gain 
considerably by threatening to cease supply. Common forms of asset specificity include 
the proximity of the supply source to the processing asset, the customization of the 
asset and human resources to the supply source, and supplier concentration. 
 
High levels of uncertainty in a market can increase the risk of hold-up, due to the need 
for frequent re-negotiation of terms. Alternatively, uncertainty can increase the costs of 
preventing hold-up by making the process of designing comprehensive contracts more 
complex, and the required price premium higher (Klein et al., 1978). 
 
An additional transaction-cost factor that is not directly related to the risk of hold-up is 
transaction frequency (Williamson, 1979). This is of great importance for the choice of 
exchange governance form, because total transactions costs are a function of costs per 
transactions and the frequency of transactions. For example, parties with large-volume 
or frequent transactions have greater incentive to lower their unit transaction costs 
through integration. 
 
 
2.2 Support for TCE theory 
 
Research in a wide variety of fields has shown that transaction cost theory can help 
understand all type of vertical integration decisions. Boerner and Macher (2001) 
provide a comprehensive review of TCE research in fields as varied as organisation 
theory, international business, law and public policy, and agricultural economics. 
 
TCE theory has been quite well tested in the forest products industry, but mainly with 
regard to integration of pulp and paper production, not forest-mill integration. Ohanian 
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(1994), Melendez (2002) and Wang (2005) have all shown that transaction cost factors 
have an important role in determining the degree to which paper mills have integrated 
pulp production versus buying pulp from other producers. However, these studies used 
publicly available information on a few mill parameters, especially capacity, grade mix, 
and derived estimates for regional concentration. They were therefore limited by the 
data source in the breadth of TCE factors that could be tested, with the associated risk 
of exclude 
ing important factors. 
 
Ohanian (1994) studied the integration of pulp and paper manufacture in the US 
between 1900 and 1940, with respect to four variables. These were market 
concentration (measured as the product of the market shares of the largest four 
producers in a given region, by capacity),  the logarithm of paper capacity, and the 
proportion of capacity that was newsprint and kraft paper respectively (integration was 
hypothesised to be higher in production of these grades, due to a relatively low level of 
specialisation). She found that integration was positively and significantly associated 
with all four variables, and concluded that transaction costs appear to influence 
integration. The evidence was particularly strong for new mills, because few mills 
switched between integrated and non-integrated once established. Ohanian recognised 
however that the narrow selection of variables may have led to important variables 
being omitted. 
 
Melendez (2002) argued that integration in pulp and paper was influenced by a mill 
characteristic not observed in previous studies: mill productivity determines whether 
mills remain in use, and whether they are integrated. She used the same data as 
Ohanian (1994) but for 1975-1995, and chose a dynamic model in order to eliminate 
the problem of selection and simultaneity bias arising from mills entering and exiting 
the industry. Melendez also found that integration was positively associated with mill 
capacity and grade specialization, but in contrast to Ohanian (1994) she found that it 
was negatively associated with market concentration. It seems that market 
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concentration was endogenously determined, and therefore yielded biased estimates in 
the model5.  
 
Wang (2005) attempted to clarify the role of market concentration in pulp and paper 
integration. He used a mill-specific concentration measure (a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index for seller and buyer market respectively within a set radius from the mill, 
excluding mills owned by the same firm) and focused on uncoated freesheet (a paper 
grade where non-integration is still relatively common). Wang also used a dummy for 
region in order to control for the impact of forest abundance on concentration and 
integration6. With these refinements, he was able to show a significant positive 
relationship between market concentration and integration.  
 
As discussed in section 1.3, Globermann and Schwindt (1986) studied transaction 
governance structures in the Canadian forest products industry, and found very few 
anomalies with TCE theory. However, in the case of forest-mill integration, the high 
level of integration could also be explained by the process of allocating cutting rights. 
Also, the findings were somewhat anecdotal, based on observed integration patterns 
and speculation about how TCE theory could explain those patterns.  
 
TCE theory has also been shown useful in understanding forest companies’ choice of 
contractual forms and payment for silvicultural operations. Wang and van Kooten 
(1998) studied companies’ decisions to contract out silvicultural activities or perform 
these in-house, with respect to various firm and activity attributes. The work was based 
                                                 
5 During 1900-1940, the US paper industry expanded into the South, and the new mills were typically 
large and integrated for long-term competitiveness (there are significant efficiencies of scale in paper 
production, and market pulp tends to cost more than integrated pulp due to costs of drying and transport), 
while the abundant forests in the region made it possible to build large integrated mills. The small 
number of mills in the region meant a high concentration measure, and hence the positive association of 
concentration with integration in Ohanian’s (1994) model. By 1975-1995, the difference in market 
concentration in the US regions had narrowed and Melendex (2002) could not find the same relationship. 
6 Wang (2005) argued that, at least in a migratory industry, regions with abundant forests would likely be 
colonized by new, integrated mills. This would result in both high concentration and high integration, 
contrary to the predictions of TCE theory, unless forest abundance was controlled for.  
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on data from a survey of forest companies in British Columbia, including details of 697 
recent operations, and participants’ ratings of transaction cost attributes for the most 
common types of attributes. They tested both a probit model (where decisions were 
categorised as out-sourced or any in-house performance) and an ordered probit model 
(where a decision was represented as out-sourced, a combination of both forms, or fully 
in-house), and found that the TCE factors were highly significant. In particular, firms 
are more likely to perform the operations in-house if they require a high degree of 
technical skill or must be performed often.   
 
Using data from the same survey, Wang et al. (2000) focused on how silvicultural 
workers are paid; with piece-rates or time-based payment. The hypothesis of the 
research was that managers chose the payment scheme that minimizes transaction 
costs, and that the costs depend on the characteristics of the firm and the silvicultural 
activity. An important cost in such transactions (the purchase of labour) is shirking; on 
quantity where time-based payment is used, and on quality with piece rates. The 
relative importance of quality and quantity, and the difficulty of monitoring each, were 
expected to be key considerations. They used both a probit model (for the dichotomous 
choice of piece-rate or time-based payment) and an ordered probit model (for the 
polychotomous choice of piece-rate, hourly wage, or salary). The results indicated that 
piece rates are preferred by smaller firms, and for basic silviculture where operations 
are highly standardised. Time-based payment was preferred by larger firms, and for 
enhanced silviculture where quality is paramount. 
 
There is further research the importance of TCE in other commodity industries that 
provides some clues on what factors could influence the forest-mill integration. These 
include Hobbs’ (1997) study of cattle marketing and MacInnes’ (2003) study of retail 
and wholesale marketing of organic farm produce.  
 
Hobbs (1997) looked at the factors influencing UK farmers’ decisions to sell cattle by 
auction or direct-to-packer, where the former channel is closer to the market transaction 
model than the latter, on a market-integrated scale. The research was based on survey 
data on very diverse variables, analysed with a tobit regression model. Hobbs found 
strong support for the importance of transaction cost factors in affecting this decision. 
The factors that seemed to encourage direct-to-packer sales were the time farmers must 
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spend travelling to and attending auctions, the risk that the cattle may not sell at the 
auction, the average number of cattle in a sale lot, and farmers’ satisfaction with packer 
procurement staff. Price uncertainty from selling by auction did not have any 
significant influence on the decision. 
 
MacInnes (2003) studied organic farmer’s access to indirect markets (retail and 
wholesale intermediaries), where the alternative is the direct sale of own produce. He 
used data from a nationwide survey of US organic farmers, including variables on 
market, farm and socioeconomic parameters, analysed with both tobit and logit 
regression models. The results supported the importance of several TCE factors from 
all three categories. For example, access to indirect markets and oversupply of organic 
produce were associated with greater use of indirect channels, while distance to market,  
failure of buyers to honour commitments, access to direct “farmer’s” markets, and the 
number of different products sold were associated with a higher degree of direct sales. 
 
 
2.3 Challenges in TCE research 
 
The two key challenges for all empirical TCE research are data availability and the 
measurement of TCE factors. Other issues cited are the need for a more formal 
theoretical foundation, and the treatment of endogenous explanatory variables (Sykuta, 
2005, Boerner and Macher, 2001).  
 
Boerner and Macher (2001) found that “the most common means of primary data 
collection in empirical TCE research are mail surveys, interviews and firm visits”. 
While primary data collection is relatively costly, and this often leads to small sample 
sizes, it can be the best approach to obtain useful data. Secondary data sources include 
industry registers and trade publications. These contain predefined datasets, often with 
insufficient detail, that allow researchers little room to derive appropriate measures for 
integration and its drivers.  
 
Data limitations can be a reason for difficulties in measuring TCE factors. Exact 
measurement of asset specificity and uncertainty is usually not possible, but relies on 
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proxies. For example, Ohanian (1994) and Wang (2005) used regional asset 
concentration as a measure of asset specificity. Other proxies commonly used for asset 
specificity include geographic proximity, employees’ own ratings, and advertising or 
research and development intensity (Boerner and Macher, 2001). Such proxies may not 
always be good measures of the size of the quasi-rent, and thereby the risk for 
opportunistic behaviour. Besides data limitations, Sykuta (2005) argues that the poor 
definition of theoretical concepts in TCE is also to blame. 
 
Boerner and Macher (2001) call for a more formalised theoretical foundation, which 
would allow more precise definition and testing of TCE factors. TCE theory suffers 
from multiple and even competing definitions of concepts, such as uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is commonly defined either as environmental (referring to state-changes in 
the circumstances surrounding the exchange) or behavioural uncertainty (for example, 
strategic nondisclosure or distortion of information). Boerner and Macher (2001) found 
that TCE research has conflicting findings regarding the role of uncertainty in the 
choice of transaction governance, and suggest that greater conceptual clarity would 
help.  
 
Finally, an issue raised by both Syutka (2005) and Boerner and Macher (2001) in their 
reviews of empirical TCE research is endogenous transaction cost variables. It is 
common to treat variables, such as asset specificity, as exogenous (i.e. environmental 
factors that influence the choice of governance form) whereas they can be choice 
variables within a firm manager’s control.  Care should therefore be taken to identify 
which variables are endogenous. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The method chosen for this research was to survey sawmill and pulpmill managers to 
ascertain the mill’s level of integration in fibre supply, and the mill-related factors that 
could influence this decision. The latter included both known transaction cost factors 
and other suspected drivers. Integration was measured as the percent of total fibre 
needs that come from own forests, long-term contracts, and the open market. A survey 
was chosen as the best approach, because information on many of the most important 
factors is not available from public sources. The survey data was complemented with 
public data where available. 
 
The following section outlines the methodology applied to survey design, survey 
execution, and data analysis. 
 
 
3.1 Survey design 
 
There were several steps involved in designing the survey including the review of 
similar surveys from other industries, interviews with contacts in the industry, 
distributing the draft survey for feedback, and incorporating the feedback. 
 
1. Review of similar surveys from other industries 
 
The studies that were of most use in designing the survey for this research were Hobbs’ 
(1997) study of cattle marketing, MacInnes’ (2003) study of retail and wholesale 
marketing of organic farm produce, and Antaniori and Rausser’s (2001) study of 
community forest ownership in Mexico. 
 
2. Interviews with contacts in the forest products industry 
 
At an early stage in the research, informal interviews were conducted with colleagues 
in the forest products industry, and other representatives of forest and mill owners. The 
objective was simply to hear their opinion on what the most important factors are that 
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influence forest-mill integration. Many of the learnings from these interviews are 
reflected in section 4, “TCE factors in fibre sourcing”. An interesting finding was that 
many of the factors considered important have nothing to do with TCE theory, such as 
company history and identity, perceived rate of return on forest assets, and the need to 
free capital. This was explored further in the survey. 
 
3. Review of draft survey  
 
Once a survey was drafted, it was circulated among colleagues, industry and academic 
contacts. These included consultants to the forest product industry, researchers in the 
fields of forest economics and industrial economics, my supervisors and their 
colleagues. The purpose of the review was to ensure that the survey was valid from a 
technical perspective, and that the questions were clear and answerable.  
 
This review provided a lot of valuable feedback, such as the need to shorten and 
simplify the survey in order to increase response rate. Another useful discussion was 
the appropriate radius for defining the economically viable limit for transporting logs 
and chips to the mill. This is important when ascertaining asset specificity. There is no 
common definition for fibre basin radius, but it depends on the transport network and 
value of a given fibre grade. One option considered was to allow respondents to define 
the size of their fibre basin, but this could have introduced a bias that was difficult to 
control for. Instead, a constant definition was used, reflecting the typical radius for each 
of the two regions. According to information from the Swedish Forest Agency (2007) 
and New Zealand Ministry of Forestry (1997, 2001), an average distance of 90-100 km 
is typical for fibre transport in both countries. A radius of 120 km was therefore 
considered appropriate to describe the full fibre supply basin.  
 
4. Designing the final survey 
 
Four surveys were designed, one each for sawmills and pulpmills, and in both English 
and Swedish. The translations were done in a way that would minimize the potential for 
differences in interpretation, and they were reviewed by those contacts in step (3) that 
speak English and Swedish.   
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The only difference between the surveys for sawmills and pulpmills was that the latter 
required questions covering the use of wood chips in addition to logs, and some 
questions were omitted because the information could be obtained from public sources. 
Pulpmills can use wood chips and other residues from sawmills, in addition to pulplogs. 
The two are substitutes, but chips are generally cheaper and of lower quality. In the 
case of pulpmills, the level of integration in chip supply might influence the integration 
of log supply. The questions omitted from the pulpmill surveys were on mill capacity 
and capacity by grade category, both of which are available from NLK Associates’ 
global pulp and paper mill database. The final surveys are included in Appendix 4.  
 
 
3.2 Survey execution 
 
Survey execution involved four steps; identifying the mills in each region, selecting a 
random sample of mills, distributing the survey, and data collection. 
 
1. Identifying the mills in each region 
Lists were compiled of the sawmills and pulpmills in each region, from a variety of 
sources. The NLK Associates database was used to identify pulpmills, including both 
integrated and market pulp capacity. Swedish sawmills were identified using lists from 
the Swedish Forest Industries Federation and the Swedish Forest Agency. For New 
Zealand sawmills, lists from the NZ Ministry of Forestry and NZ Timber Industry 
Federation were used.  
 
2. Selecting a random sample of mills 
A random sample of mills from each group was selected. The population, sample size 
and response rate by group are summarised in Table 1. A sample size was chosen that 
should provide a strong base for analysis and statistically significant results, allowing 
for non-responses. All six pulpmills in New Zealand were sampled. 
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 Table 1: Summary of sample rate and response rate 
Group Population Sample Sample 
rate 
Responses Response 
rate 
Sawmills, 
Sweden 
200 50 25% 32 64% 
Pulpmills, 
Sweden 
38 30 79% 23 77% 
Sawmills,      
New Zealand 
212* 50 24% 28 56% 
Pulpmills,     
New Zealand 
6 6 100% 5 83% 
Total 456 136 30% 88 65% 
* Phone interviews suggest that many of these mills are closed or portable (excluded 
from the study), so the actual sample population is probably much smaller  
 
Telephone directories7 were used to cross-check the lists and obtain contact details. The 
target participants were mill managers (or procurement managers if that role existed). 
All sampled participants were called and spoken to directly, in order to explain the 
purpose of the survey, ascertain the most appropriate mill employee to answer the 
survey, and obtain buy-in from participants. In some cases, the identified employee 
indicated at this point that they did not want to participate in the survey. These mills 
were counted as non-responses.  
 
3. Distribution of survey 
The surveys were internet-based, using an internet survey service called 
SurveyMonkey8. After calling the participants, a link to the survey was sent by email, 
together with a mill-specific user code for identification of each mills' results. The 
email also included further information on the purpose of the research. 
 
4. Data collection 
Each participant’s response was stored automatically on SurveyMonkey’s database, 
where it could be downloaded at any time. The responses were supplemented with 
publicly available data, and participants contacted for clarification where necessary. 
                                                 
7 http://gulasidorna.eniro.se and http://yellow.co.nz  
8 http://www.surveymonkey.com  
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3.3 Econometric analysis  
 
The dependent variable in TCE research is often a self-sufficiency ratio, the proportion 
of supply that is integrated. Two types of models are typically used for proportions as 
the dependent variable; the two-limit tobit and fractional logit.  
 
Tobit is a linear regression model for continuous censored dependent variables, such as 
proportions bounded by 0% and 100%, described in Greene (2003, p 764-773). It uses a 
latent variable y* and estimates the distribution of y* unconstrained by the censor 
boundaries. The two-limit tobit model is specified as follows:  
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where *y  is the latent variable (the level of supply integration), x  is the vector of 
independent variables, μ is the error term, 1L  and 2L  are the lower and upper limits 
respectively.  
 
The likelihood function for the tobit model is  
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where F is the normal cumulative function, and f is the normal density function.  
 
The tobit model is commonly applied to TCE problems (Sykuta 2005, Hobbs 1997, 
MacInnes 2003). However, there are two important drawbacks of the tobit model. 
Firstly, the validity of the tobit model depends on two important assumptions; the error 
term must be homoskedastic and normally distributed. Secondly, while it may be 
suitable for data censored by two limits, it may not be appropriate to apply to data 
defined within those limits (Maddala, 1991). Self-sufficiency proportions of 0% or 
100% would be assumed to represent missing (censored) variables. They are however 
real observations, not missing or censored per se. 
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The fractional logit model was developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), 
specifically to deal with proportions data. It has also found use in TCE research, for 
example by MacInnes (2003). The model does not have the drawbacks of the tobit 
model, and is preferable for this analysis.  
 
The fractional logit model is an extension of the logit model, given by:  
( ) ( )ββ xx eexyE += 1     (3) 
The model is estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood function  
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where ( )eeexG xx βββ += 1)(  
 
An important advantage of the fractional logit model is that while it assumes a logistic 
distribution, the model is consistent with alternative distributions. It is therefore not 
necessary to test whether the logistic distribution holds in order to obtain statistically 
reliable results    
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4 TCE FACTORS IN FIBRE SOURCING  
 
As discussed in chapter two, TCE theory has been used to help understand contracting 
and economic organisation in a wide range of situations, but rarely forest-mill 
integration. The following chapter provides a discussion of the TCE factors that are 
likely to influence the forest integration decision. This is based on the application of 
TCE theory to other industries, interviews with contacts in the industry, and own 
experience. According to TCE theory, transaction frequency, uncertainty, and asset 
specificity are likely to influence the integration decision. 
 
 
4.1 Transaction frequency 
 
Transaction frequency can be measured simply as the volume of fibre consumed in a 
given period. This is clearly related to the mill capacity. Larger mills should be more 
likely to source more of their fibre needs from own forests, due to scale effects (the 
total saving made through internalising the fibre purchase transaction are larger relative 
to the fixed costs of forest ownership). Companies with several mills in the same fibre 
basin, and thereby greater fibre needs, will also have increased incentives to own forest. 
 
 
4.2 Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty in terms of price volatility and the likelihood that the mill can meet its fibre 
needs should impact the cost of buying on the open market and through contracts. Fibre 
prices tend to be volatile due to their sensitivity to unforeseeable factors such as 
harvesting conditions, storm events, and forest health. Fibre markets tend to be local, 
due to log and chips’ relatively low value to volume ratio, and thereby high 
transportation cost. For this reason, price rises cannot always be passed onto the mill’s 
customers, which may be sourcing from mills in several distinct fibre markets. As 
discussed in section 2.1, contracting costs also increase with uncertainty. 
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4.3 Asset specificity 
 
It is perhaps the forest product industry’s level of asset specificity makes it most 
unique. The adaptation of a mill to its fibre basin, the enormous variety in fibre grades  
and the profound impact these have on mill products, and the limited potential to 
relocate a mill all lead to very high levels of asset specificity.  
 
Asset specificity can take several forms, which will be discussed separately: 
1. Buyer and supplier concentration 
2. Site specificity 
3. Technical specificity 
4. Human capital specificity 
 
4.3.1 Supplier and buyer concentration 
 
The concentration of suppliers and buyers determines the number of potential 
transaction partners, and thereby a mill’s bargaining power and supply security. 
Markets with few buyers and sellers are likely to fail entirely. The cost of the 
transaction through market mechanisms is too great, and the transaction is therefore 
internalised (integrated). 
 
Ceterus paribus, in a market with fewer suppliers the suppliers will have increased 
bargaining power. In such markets, a mill should have greater incentive to integrate. In 
markets with few buyers and many suppliers, the buyers have a strong bargaining 
position and are less likely to integrate. The suppliers (forest owners) could then gain 
through integrating forwards, but are typically too small to do so. 
 
Forest ownership and the downstream processing industry tend to be very fragmented, 
and this is certainly the case in New Zealand and Sweden. However, fibre markets are 
relatively local and there is considerable variation in concentration by fibre basin. 
 
The surveys captured concentration with questions on the supply/demand share of the 
top three suppliers/consumers. Another way to measure concentration would be the 
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total number of suppliers a mill has, but a limited number of actual suppliers might not 
indicate a shortage of alternative suppliers. The mere presence of alternative suppliers 
gives the mill a sense of supply security 
 
Forest owner associations could impact the cost of fibre in two ways: 
1. Raising costs through increasing supplier concentration and bargaining power. 
2. Lowering costs by more coordinated and efficient harvesting and marketing. 
 
The former effect would probably encourage integration and the latter encourage non-
integration of forest ownership. The overall impact would depend on the balance of 
these two effects.  
 
Forest owner associations are widespread in Sweden and often help their members 
harvest and sell their logs. The only association of forest owners in New Zealand is the 
Farm Forestry Association, which mainly offers members a forum to meet likeminded 
farmers and exchange ideas. It does not have a role in coordinating harvesting and 
sales, although it can facilitate sawmill and pulpmill’s contacts with small forest 
owners and improve forest owners’ market savvy. 
 
4.3.2 Site specificity 
 
Site specificity is the degree to which a production unit is dependent on the supply 
available at its particular location. An important concept in considering site specificity 
is the mill’s fibre basin. As discussed, a radius of 120 km was assumed in this study.  
 
The survey measured site specificity in terms of the volume of fibre available in the 
fibre basin relative to mill needs. If the mill’s needs represent a higher proportion of the 
supply in the basin, the mill is more dependent on that fibre basin and should have 
greater incentive to integrate.  
 
Another important factor determining site specificity and a mill’s sense of supply 
security is the fibre balance in the basin. For example, a supply surplus and net export 
of logs will increase a mill’s supply security, because the cost of exporting logs from 
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the fibre basin will almost always be greater than delivery to the local market. Suppliers 
will therefore normally prefer to sell to a local consumer than to export. Similarly, 
imported logs will normally be more expensive and less attractive to buyers than local 
log supplies, and a net fibre deficit (import) will usually make sourcing fibre on the 
local market more difficult.  
 
One way that mills can influence their site specificity is to engage in “fibre swaps” with 
other mills. For example, if the mill owner had access to fibre in another basin (from 
own forests, chips or through contracts), and a mill owner in that basin in turn had 
access to fibre in the first basin, then the two could swap fibre to their mutual 
advantage. This is a quite common practice in the Swedish forest industry, in order to 
reduce transport costs and increase security of supply. 
 
4.3.3 Technical specificity 
 
Technical specificity is the level to which the production unit’s equipment and 
processes are tailored to a specific supply. The level of technical specificity in both the 
sawmill and pulp industry is very high, with mills’ operations and marketing being 
highly interrelated with the type of fibre used. This resource-specific investment would 
be expected to increase a mill’s incentive to integrate. 
 
It was however not practical to probe sawmills on the log grade used. There is no 
standard log grade system in either NZ or Sweden (forest owners tend to have different 
systems), and the systems that exist are very complex. While there are usually only a 
few pulpwood grades, there is enormous variation in sawlog grades. Sawlogs are 
usually graded by diameter and length, and even by knot size in NZ. The limits for the 
dimensions vary, and the various combinations can yield 20-40 grades. Pulpwood 
grades are often simply species-related, because it is fibre qualities not log dimensions 
that are of most importance for pulp manufacture. 
 
For these reasons, it was decided to measure technical specificity in terms of the 
species used, and participants’ own rating of how specific the fibre consumed at their 
mill is to their particular operations (in terms of dimensions, wood qualities, etc). Mills 
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using "minority" species have higher specificity, while using common species or a mix 
of several species have lower specificity. 
  
In NZ, the majority of sawmills use radiata pine, but some use Douglas fir, and a few 
use Eucalyptus species. Swedish sawmills are mostly focused on either pine (often for 
appearance-grade applications) or spruce (often for structural applications). Pulpmills 
tend to mix species to a higher degree, because they often have several pulp lines, and 
because integrated pulp-paper mills usually want both hardwood and softwood fibre in 
the paper. In Sweden the main pulpwood species are spruce, pine and birch, while in 
NZ they are radiata pine and Eucalyptus species. 
 
4.3.4 Human capital specificity 
 
Human capital specificity is the degree to which the skills, experience, and other 
qualities of the organisation’s employees are suited specifically to the input supply. In 
general, human capital investment is a relatively small part of a forest owner or a mill 
owner's total capital investment, and unlikely to influence their integration decisions.  
 
Forest owners are unlikely to invest in mill-specific human capital with regard to 
silviculture (forest tending), given the long lead times required before harvest and 
thereby large uncertainty about who the best customer will be. In the forest-to-mill 
supply chain, the mill-specific investment is focused on harvesting operations. 
However, when these are highly specific to a given mill’s operations, a mill could 
secure these investments simply by acquiring its own harvesting operations, without 
actually needing to own forestland.  
 
Mills that are geared towards a certain type of resource (i.e. have high technical 
specificity) will likely invest in resource-specific human capital in order to run their 
operations most effectively. This would indeed mean higher costs of losing access to 
that resource, and may encourage integration into forest ownership. It may also be seen 
in the extent to which procurement staff build relationships with forest owners. This 
effect is very much related to technical specificity, and should be captured by the 
survey in the participants’ rating of fibre specificity.  
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5 RESULTS 
 
From the survey and complementary data, 22 variables were defined. Of these, three 
could be used as dependent variables, two are measures of transaction frequency, four 
relate to uncertainty, nine are measures of asset specificity, and the remaining four are 
the non-TCE factors tested.  The following section provides a summary of that data, 
and the regression models derived to help understand the factors influencing 
integration. 
 
 
5.1 Summary of data 
 
An initial scan of the results reveals that integrated mills are relatively few; only 33 of 
the 88 participant mills used logs or chips from own sources, and full integration was 
13.7% on average  (refer to Table 2). Forest ownership is even more rare; the number 
of mills using logs from own forests was 29, and own logs represented on average only 
11.0% of consumption. Partial integration through long-term supply contracts is more 
common; 57 of the mills used some contract fibre.  
 
The main source of fibre is the open market, representing 49.5% of consumption on 
average. Of the 88 mills, 75 used some market fibre, and 22 sourced all fibre from the 
market. The distribution of the fibre mix variable is summarized in Figure 2.  
 
This means that when modelling the drivers of integration, it would be difficult to get 
significant results by looking at the share of wood from own forests. It is therefore 
necessary to study integration in terms of fibre both from own forests and from long-
term contracts, versus the open market. 
 
Average mill size was around 225,000 dry tonnes per year of wood consumption9, but 
this varies greatly by milltype; for sawmills the average was 90,000 dry tonnes, while 
                                                 
9 Assuming dry density of 500kg/cubic meter for sawmills, which reported consumption in cubic meters 
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for pulpmills it was 513,000 tonnes (refer to Appendix 2 for a data summary by 
milltype). The number of mills owned by the same organisation in the same fibre basin 
was two on average, with a maximum of 13 in the case of one sawmill in Southern 
Sweden. This reflects the density of the industry that part of Sweden, the size of some 
of the forest product companies, and their asset concentration in certain regions. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of fibre mix 
The following graphs show the 88 observations ordered by the share of their fibre consumption obtained 
from each source (internally, through long-term contracts, and the open market) respectively. 
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It seems that respondents are more concerned about price volatility than they are about 
the costs of price discovery. This helps explain why sourcing from the market is 
relatively popular; price volatility makes contracting more difficult, while price 
transparency enables fairer market transactions.  
 
Unsurprisingly, market concentration was reported higher for buyers than both forest 
ownership and chip supply. Forest ownership tends to be more fragmented than the 
wood processing industry. This was especially apparent in Sweden, and may explain 
why mills in Sweden report less supply uncertainty that those in New Zealand (refer to 
Appendix 2 for a data summary by region). However, the New Zealand mills enjoy a 
better fibre trade balance, as will be discussed further in section 5.3. 
 
On average, forest owner associations are perceived to have an upward influence on 
fibre prices. But again, there is significant regional variation; the Swedish respondents 
rated the impact of associations much higher than those in New Zealand. Similarly, few 
mills reported any significant degree of fibre swaps, but it appears much more common 
in Sweden. 
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Table 2: List of variables defined from data 
Variable 
category 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min-
imum 
Max-
imum 
fibreo Share of fibre consumption that is from own 
forests or mills, % 13.7 26.6 0 100 
fibrec Share of fibre consumption that is from long-
term contracts, % 36.8 36.8 0 100 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
fibrem Share of fibre consumption that is from the open 
market, % 49.5 38.5 0 100 
size Mill fibre consumption, in thousand metric 
tonnes  224.5 279.2 0 1250 
Transaction 
frequency 
mills Number of mills (in the fibre basin) owned by 
the organisation 2.2 2.1 1 13 
uncert Uncertainty of supply (Likert scale, 1=very 
reliable →  5=highly uncertain) 2.9 1.4 1 5 
pricevol Price volatility (Likert scale, 1=very stable →  
5=highly volatile) 2.9 1.0 1 5 
costcon Costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts 
(Likert scale, 1=not significant →  5=very 
significant) 2.4 1.2 1 5 
Uncertainty 
costprice Difficulty of monitoring market price for fibre 
(Likert scale, 1=simple/easy, 5=very difficult) 1.8 0.8 1 4 
forcon Forest owner concentration; share of largest 
three owners in fibre basin (1=0-10%, 2=11-
20%, 3=31-40, 4=41-60%, 5= >60%) 3.4 1.4 1 5 
chipcon (Relates to pulpmills only). Chip supplier 
concentration; share of largest three suppliers in 
fibre basin (1=0-10%, 2=11-20%, 3=31-40%, 
4=41-60%, 5=>60%)  3.5 1.1 1 5 
buycon Buyer concentration; share of largest three 
consumers of fibre in the fibre basin (1=0-10%, 
2=11-20%, 3=31-40%, 4=41-60%, 5= >60%) 4.3 0.9 1 5 
sitesp Site specificity;  fibre supply in the fibre basin 
relative to mill’s needs (1= >10x, 2= 7-10x, 3= 
5-6x, 4= 3-4x, 5= 1-2x needs) 3.0 1.6 1 5 
balance Fibre balance in basin (1=export >10%, 
2=export 0-10%, 3=balance, 4=import 0-10%, 
5=import >10%) 2.9 1.5 1 5 
fibresp Degree to which the fibre consumed is specific 
to the mill’s particular operations (Likert scale, 
1=not at all specific →  5=highly specific) 3.3 1.4 1 5 
sp_type Type of species consumed (1=common, 
2=mixed, 3=niche) 1.3 0.5 1 3 
sp_number The number of different species consumed  1.6 0.8 1 4 
Asset 
specificity  
grade Main grade produced at the mill, for 
saw/pulpmills: 1= >60% structural lumber 
/mechanical pulp, 2= 40-60% of each, 3= >60% 
appearance lumber /chemical pulp 1.8 0.9 1 3 
assoc Perceived impact of forest owner associations 
on fibre costs, (1=lower costs, 2=no impact, 
3=higher costs) 2.4 0.7 1 3 
formown Form of mill ownership (1=private, single mill, 
2= private, multi-mill, 3=public, single mill, 4= 
public, multi-mill)   2.2 1.2 1 4 
millage Age of the mill; year of first establishment 1940.4 40.2 1765 2001 
Non-TCE 
factors 
swaps Degree to which the mill engages in strategic 
fibre swaps (1=no, 2= yes to limited degree, 3= 
yes to significant degree) 1.4 0.7 1 3 
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5.2 Combined model 
 
The dependent variable chosen for the modelling was fibrem, the proportion of fibre 
from the open market. Before modelling the combined data, correlations were studied 
in order to test for collinearity in the explanatory variables (refer to Table 3). No 
variable combinations had scores of >0.7, which would raise concern. Those 
combinations with a relatively high correlation include sp_number/sp_type and 
sp_number/grade; these three variables were all intended to measure mills’ technical 
specificity.  
 
Not surprisingly, size is positively correlated with sitesp (mill demand relative to total 
supply), sp_number (the number of species consumed) and formown (form of 
ownership, where public has a higher score than private, and multiple-mills higher than 
single-mill organisations). It is also interesting that forcon (forest owner concentration) 
is quite highly and positively correlated with uncert (perceived uncertainty of supply)10. 
The dependent variable, fibrem is mostly highly correlated with the variables mills, 
uncert, costprice, balance, fibresp, formown, millage and swaps, and this gives some 
early clues about what factors might be important for the integration decision.  
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix of all variables 
Scores that are > 0.7 or <-0.7 are shown in bold text. 
fibrem size mills uncert
price-
vol
cost-
con
cost-
price forcon
buy-
con sitesp
bal-
ance
fibre-
sp
sp_   
type
sp_    
number grade assoc
form-
own
mill-
age swaps
fibrem 1.00
size -0.10 1.00
mills -0.23 0.23 1.00
uncert -0.29 0.00 -0.01 1.00
pricevol 0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.09 1.00
costcon -0.08 -0.12 -0.09 0.06 0.11 1.00
costprice -0.21 -0.16 0.08 0.27 0.24 0.21 1.00
forcon -0.13 -0.23 -0.05 0.34 0.07 0.20 0.06 1.00
buycon 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.16 -0.17 -0.16 0.11 1.00
sitesp 0.01 0.48 0.18 0.10 -0.02 -0.30 -0.03 -0.19 0.16 1.00
balance -0.21 0.32 0.19 0.18 0.11 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 0.28 0.11 1.00
fibresp -0.36 -0.18 0.05 0.20 0.07 0.31 0.33 0.35 -0.12 -0.21 -0.03 1.00
sp_type -0.02 0.21 -0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.08 0.10 0.23 0.23 0.11 -0.09 1.00
sp_number -0.01 0.50 -0.05 -0.12 0.08 0.07 -0.01 -0.21 0.12 0.21 0.30 -0.20 0.51 1.00
grade -0.02 0.40 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.11 -0.18 0.00 0.21 0.08 0.03 0.14 0.38 1.00
assoc 0.03 0.18 0.24 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.13 -0.15 -0.06 0.13 0.08 -0.20 0.06 0.18 0.10 1.00
formown -0.22 0.52 0.26 -0.08 -0.24 -0.24 -0.05 -0.39 0.02 0.32 0.17 -0.10 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.23 1.00
millage 0.32 -0.20 -0.22 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.17 0.17 -0.03 -0.09 -0.17 -0.07 0.02 -0.15 -0.07 -0.29 -0.31 1.00
swaps -0.36 0.25 0.27 0.09 -0.15 -0.07 0.09 0.06 -0.07 0.13 0.04 0.17 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.37 -0.22 1.00  
 
                                                 
10 This was particularly evident among pulpmills, where the correlation was 0.61 
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As discussed in section 3.3, fractional logit regression was chosen as the most 
appropriate model (tobit and ordinary least squares regression were also tested, and 
these are presented in Appendix 3).  
 
Initially, a model with all variables was constructed to identify which TCE factors seem 
most relevant. This model is shown in Table 4. Two dummy variables were used, one 
to control for milltype (sawmills=0, pulpmills=1), and the other for region (Sweden=0, 
New Zealand=1). Many variables have very low significance, and should clearly be 
dropped from the model immediately. These included two TCE factors relating to 
uncertainty (costcon and costprice) and five relating to asset specificity (buycon, sitesp, 
grade, sp_type and sp_number). 
 
Table 4: Combined fractional logit model, all factors 
Variable 
category 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Z P>|z| 
milltype -1.34 0.57 -2.37 0.02 Dummy 
variables region 0.83 0.73 1.13 0.26 
size 0.00 0.00 1.66 0.10 Transaction 
frequency mills -0.14 0.08 -1.76 0.08 
uncert -0.29 0.15 -1.92 0.05 
pricevol 0.28 0.23 1.21 0.23 
costcon -0.08 0.19 -0.44 0.66 
Uncertainty 
costprice -0.16 0.31 -0.52 0.60 
forcon -0.19 0.20 -0.94 0.35 
buycon 0.07 0.24 0.31 0.76 
sitesp -0.01 0.14 -0.04 0.97 
balance -0.17 0.12 -1.38 0.17 
fibresp -0.39 0.17 -2.31 0.02 
sp_type -0.26 0.47 -0.56 0.58 
sp_number 0.11 0.36 0.32 0.75 
Asset 
specificity 
grade -0.01 0.25 -0.05 0.96 
assoc 0.30 0.26 1.17 0.24 
formown -0.02 0.21 -0.08 0.94 
millage 0.01 0.01 1.15 0.25 
Non-TCE 
factors 
swaps -0.49 0.29 -1.70 0.09 
- (constant) -14.19 15.33 -0.93 0.36 
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Costcon relates specifically to contracts, but could have opposite impacts on fibrem11. 
Costprice (the difficulty of price discovery) was expected to be positively associated 
with integration. Its coefficient has the expected sign, but no significance. 
 
TCE theory holds that high market concentration of buyers (buycon) can cause market 
failure, and thereby encourage integration. However, it could also indicate that a few 
mills hold a strong bargaining position relative to forest owners, and thereby less 
incentive to integrate. Sitesp, a mill’s fibre consumption relative to total supply in the 
basin, was expected to be positively associated with integration. A theory in TCE 
research is that firms consuming a small share of total demand for an input are less 
likely to integrate, since they would lost the risk-pooling economies of large markets, 
but the results are mixed (Lieberman, 1991). In any case, it is not a true measure of site 
specificity, which is the degree to which a firm is dependent on a source of supply due 
to its proximity, and indeed all mills have supply basins constrained by fibre transport 
economics. Grade, sp_ type and sp_number, are all related to mills’ technical 
specificity, but were not found significant.  
 
The variable uncert (perceived uncertainty of supply) was also dropped due to its 
relatively high and positive correlation with forcon (forest owner concentration). Two 
very similar final models could be derived, one using the variable uncert and the other 
with forcon. The model using forcon was preferred, because it seems most likely that 
forest owner concentration leads to increased supply uncertainty, and that in turn 
increases the incentive for mills to backwards integrate. 
 
The variable swaps was dropped because it seems most likely that integration 
influences mills’ propensity to engage in strategic fibre swaps, rather than the reverse. 
Swaps was found significantly associated with integration, but not with the expected 
sign. It was originally hypothesized that swapping fibre with other forest owners could 
increase supply security without requiring forest ownership in the mill’s fibre basin, but 
it appears that mills that engage more heavily in swaps are more likely to source fibre 
                                                 
11 High costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts could encourage either full integration (forest 
ownership) or full use of the open market 
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from own forests. This may be because the motivation to swap fibre is primarily 
transport-cost driven, and only integrated forest products companies can swap fibre.  
Removing these variables, and non-significant variables in successive models, the final 
model was derived (refer to Table 5). In this process, a further five variables were 
dropped due to non-significance: one relating to uncertainty (pricevol), one measure of 
asset specificity (balance), and three non-TCE factors (assoc, formown, millage).  
 
Table 5: Combined fractional logit model 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Z P>|z| 
milltype -1.531 0.508 -3.01 0.00 Dummy variables 
region 1.295 0.447 2.90 0.00 
size 0.001 0.001 1.99 0.05 Transaction 
frequency mills -0.140 0.067 -2.09 0.04 
forcon -0.377 0.164 -2.30 0.02 Asset specificity 
fibresp -0.525 0.149 -3.53 0.00 
- (constant) 2.996 0.751 3.99 0.00 
 
 
There is strong support for TCE theory with respect to some variables, including: 
• mills, the total number of mills the owner has in the fibre basin, an indicator of 
transaction frequency and site specificity. As expected, a greater number of 
mills corresponds to more integration. 
• forcon, the concentration of forest ownership, a measure of asset specificity and 
often closely linked to market failure. As expected, higher concentration is 
associated with more integration. 
• fibresp, the degree to which the fibre that the mill consumes is specific to the 
mill’s operations, a measure of asset specificity. As expected, higher specificity 
seems to encourage more integration. 
 
Mills’ annual fibre consumption, an indicator of transaction frequency, should be an 
important integration factor according to TCE theory. While size was found to have 
strong predictive power, its influence was not in the expected direction; larger mills 
seem to source more of their fibre from the market (as long as the dummy milltype 
variable controls for differences between sawmills and pulpmills). This is a surprising 
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result, and difficult to explain. The coefficient is however close to zero; when the 
milltype dummy is removed, it assumes the expected sign and loses significance.  
 
The negative coefficient of the milltype dummy indicates that ceterus paribus, 
pulpmills tend to source less of their fibre needs on the open market. This is not 
surprising, given pulpmills’ higher capital costs and fibre consumption. A pulpmill can 
cost between USD 250 million and USD 1 billion. In contrast, a large and modern 
sawmill would typically not cost more than USD 100 million. This means that 
pulpmills have higher semi-appropriable quasi rents, and thereby greater incentive to 
integrate and thereby ensure supply security.  
 
Pulpmills also have much higher fibre consumption on average, reflected in the survey 
data in Table 2. If the economic sourcing radius is the same as for sawmills (if anything 
it should be smaller, given lower value of pulpwood relative to sawlogs), then pulpmills 
will tend to have more difficulty sourcing their fibre needs in the supply basin.  
 
Furthermore, the positive coefficient on the region dummy indicates that ceterus 
paribus, mills in New Zealand tend to source more of their fibre needs from the open 
market than mills in Sweden. Again, this result is not surprising, given fundamental 
differences in the two fibre markets. This is explored further in the following section. 
 
 
5.3 Regional models 
 
There are some differences between the fibre markets of New Zealand and Sweden that 
could be expected to drive differences in forest-mill integration patterns. One thing they 
have in common is a mixed and fragmented forest ownership (refer to Figure 1). 
Sweden has a somewhat higher state forest ownership than New Zealand (due to the 
Swedish government’s stake in Sveaskog). But apart from that, the relative share of 
companies and small forest owners, and the overall concentration of forest ownership, 
are very similar. 
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Two key differences between Sweden and New Zealand are the fibre trade balance and 
predominance of sawmills versus pulpmills. Sweden is a net importer of logs and chips, 
in the order of 10-20% of domestic production. In contrast, New Zealand exports 30-
40% of log and chip production (refer to Figure 3). Wood processors in New Zealand 
can be relatively confident of obtaining fibre at competitive prices, since forest owners’ 
alternative is to export to very distant markets (predominantly Eastern Asia). 
 
 
Figure 3: Fibre balance in Sweden and New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NZ Ministry of Forestry, “Trade and Production Statistics”, 2007; Statistics New Zealand, “Forestry Flow Tables 1996-
2003”, 2005; Swedish Forest Agency “Yearbook of Forestry”, 2007; FAO, “FAOSTAT”, 2007 
 
The pulp and paper industry is relatively underdeveloped in New Zealand, where there 
are at least 25 sawmills for every pulpmill. In Sweden the ratio is around 5 (refer to 
Table 1). In terms of fibre consumption, New Zealand sawmills consume around 8 
million cubic metres of sawlogs, while the pulpmills consume only 5 million cubic 
metres of pulplogs and chips12. In Sweden the relative consumption is the reverse, at 
around 35 and 45 million cubic metres respectively.   
 
                                                 
12 Based on production data from FAO, and assuming 50% lumber conversion, 45% chemical pulp 
conversion, 80% mechanical pulp conversion, and a wood density of 0.5 dry tonnes per cubic meter 
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Another difference is that forest growth rates are much higher in New Zealand. Radiata 
pine plantations typically yield around 20 m3/ha/year, whereas the net annual increment 
of Swedish forests is only 5 m3/ha/year. A given supply radius in New Zealand can 
potentially support more processing capacity than the same radius in Sweden. The 
wood products industry in New Zealand does tend to be concentrated in clusters, 
whereas it is relatively evenly distributed throughout Sweden. A large pulpmill in New 
Zealand could support itself completely with forestlands very near the mill. 
 
These regional differences could be expected to cause differences in forest-mill 
integration patterns. Indeed, the survey results indicate that integration is significantly 
higher in Sweden than New Zealand (refer to Table 6). Swedish mills have a greater 
reliance on own sources and long-term contracts, and less on open market supply. A 
full summary of data by region is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 6: Supply integration in Sweden and New Zealand 
Sweden New Zealand 
Fibre 
source Description Average 
Std. 
dev. Average 
Std. 
dev. 
Two tail 
t-test, 
P(|T|<|t|) 
fibreo Share of fibre consumption that is 
from own forests or mills, % 14.1 26.0 12.8 28.0 0.83 
fibrec Share of fibre consumption that is 
from long-term contracts, % 41.7 35.8 28.8 37.5 0.11 
fibrem Share of fibre consumption that is 
from the open market, % 44.2 36.4 58.4 40.9 0.09 
 
Whereas the combined model presented in chapter 5.2 was derived by first testing all 
variables then successively removing those that are least significant, a slightly different 
process was required for the strata due to their more limited number of observations. 
Full-variable models for the strata were often not statistically meaningful. A rule of 
thumb suggested by Long (1997) is that for every explanatory variable included in a 
logit model, there should be 10 observations. For example, a model for New Zealand 
mills, with a sample size of 33, should have no more than three explanatory variables. 
The approach employed was therefore to test various models, focusing on those 
explanatory variables found most relevant in the combined model. The models 
presented in Table 7 are those that had the highest likelihood scores. Note that there 
was no significant colinearity among any of the variables in the regional strata. 
 
 38
The models derived for the two regions are actually very similar, including the same 
explanatory variables and with the same sign on the coefficients: 
• milltype: pulpmills are more likely to be integrated than sawmills. 
• forcon: high concentration of forest ownership encourages integration. 
• fibresp: the more specific the fibre is to the operation, the more integration. 
 
The coefficients of the explanatory variables are larger for New Zealand, suggesting 
that integration in New Zealand is more sensitive to these factors than in Sweden. The 
constant also has a higher value for New Zealand, indicating that these three variables 
do not fully explain why the share of fibre sourced from the open market is higher in 
New Zealand than in Sweden. 
 
Table 7: Regional fractional logit models 
Sweden New Zealand 
Variable category Variable Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| 
Dummy variable milltype -0.68 0.09 -1.78 0.02 
forcon -0.31 0.06 -0.92 0.08 Asset specificity 
fibresp -0.44 0.01 -0.77 0.01 
- (constant) 2.23 0.00 7.68 0.00 
 
It is also interesting to note the explanatory variables that were significant in alternative 
models tested (refer to Appendix 3). For both regions, there is evidence that greater 
supply uncertainty (uncert) encourages integration. Another variable that may be 
relevant in Sweden is sp_type; where the use of less common species is associated with 
integration. Finally, the variable balance (local fibre balance) frequently featured in 
models for New Zealand with a significant negative coefficient, suggesting that mills 
operating in areas with a fibre shortage are more likely to have integrated supply.  
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5.4 Pulpmill and sawmill models 
 
As discussed, there are regional factors which impact the integration decision 
differently in Sweden and New Zealand. In the same way, there are fundamental 
differences between sawmills and pulpmills which could be expected to impact the 
integration decision significantly. Two of the most important differences are:  
1. Fixed costs - Pulpmills tend to be much more expensive to build or buy than 
sawmills, and therefore have higher semi-appropriable quasi rents. 
2. Scale - Pulpmills have much higher fibre consumption on average, which could 
mean that have greater difficulty obtaining sufficient fibre.  
 
Given these differences, and according to TCE theory, one would expect pulpmills to 
have greater incentive to integrate than sawmills. The pulpmills surveyed did indeed 
source a significantly lower share of supply from the open market than sawmills (refer 
to Table 8). And the significance of the milltype dummy variable in the combined 
model indicated that pulpmills’ greater propensity to integrate cannot be explained by 
those explanatory variables only (size, mills, forcon and fibresp). 
 
Table 8: Supply integration in sawmills and pulpmills 
Sawmills Pulpmills 
Fibre 
source Description Average 
Std. 
dev. Average 
Std. 
dev. 
Two tail 
t-test, 
P(|T|<|t|) 
fibreo Share of fibre consumption that is 
from own forests or mills, % 12.0 25.1 17.1 29.8 0.40 
fibrec Share of fibre consumption that is 
from long-term contracts, % 33.2 35.7 44.7 38.4 0.17 
fibrem Share of fibre consumption that is 
from the open market, % 54.8 39.4 38.1 34.6 0.06 
 
Several alternative models were tested, the two milltype-specific fractional logit 
models were derived (refer to Table 9).  With only 28 observations for pulpmills, that 
model is necessarily small. For pulpmills, higher integration was found positively 
associated with forest owner concentration and fibre specificity. This is the same 
result as for the combined model and consistent with TCE theory.  
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For sawmills, integration was positively associated with mill size, the number of mills 
in the fibre basin, and the cost of price discovery. Again, this is consistent with TCE 
theory. Interestingly, forest owner concentration was not found significant for 
sawmills, and price volatility would appear to discourage integration. While supply 
uncertainty is generally expected to drive integration, Lieberman (1991) suggests that 
volatility in an input market may discourage integration if the volatility of the input 
and product markets are correlated. Given the significance of fibre for pulpmill and 
especially sawmill operating costs, and the competitive nature of these industries, it is 
not surprising that product prices tend to follow fibre prices. Therefore, non-
integration may be attractive from a risk management perspective.  
 
Table 9: Sawmill and pulpmill fractional logit models 
Sawmills Pulpmills 
Variable category Variable Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| 
size -0.005 0.06   Transaction 
frequency mills -0.153 0.04   
pricevol 0.516 0.01   Uncertainty 
costprice -0.632 0.06   
forcon   -0.42 0.01 Asset specificity 
fibresp -0.382 0.05 -0.50 0.00 
- (constant) 2.23 0.07 2.10 0.00 
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6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Support for TCE theory in fibre-supply integration 
 
The results lend support for the significance of TCE factors in fibre-supply integration. 
There is evidence that variables within all three categories of TCE factors (frequency, 
asset specificity, and uncertainty) impact forest-mill integration decisions, but foremost 
asset specificity (refer to Table 10).  
 
Integration is clearly more likely if the organisation owning the mill also owns several 
other mills in the fibre basin. The role of mill size remains unclear. As a proxy for 
transaction frequency, large mills were expected to be integrated to a greater extent. 
However, mill size was found to be negatively associated with integration in the 
combined model (while milltype was controlled for), and negatively associated with 
integration for sawmills. 
 
Table 10: Summary of findings 
Impact on integration TCE factor 
categories 
Evidence 
for factor’s 
importance 
Variables found to have significance 
Expected Actual Notes 
Frequency Fair • Number of mills in basin (mills) 
• Mill size (mills) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
 
(1) 
Uncertainty Weak • Uncertainty of fibre supply (uncert) 
• Cost of price discovery (costprice) 
• Price volatility 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
- 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Asset 
specificity 
Strong • Fibre specificity (fibresp) 
• Forest-owner concentration (forcon) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
Non-TCE 
factors 
Strong • Mill type (milltype) 
• Region (region) 
N/A 
N/A 
 (4) 
(4) 
Notes:  (1) Mill size was found negatively associated with integration in the combined model (while the milltype dummy present), 
but positively associated with integration in the sawmill model.  (2) Uncert was found positively and significantly associated with 
integration, but highly correlated with forcon; it seems most likely that concentrated forest ownership leads to both supply 
uncertainty and supply integration. (3) TCE theory predicts high volatility in the input market to encourage supply integration, 
unless correlated with volatility in the product market. (4) Integration was found to be higher for pulpmills than for sawmills, and 
higher in Sweden than in New Zealand. 
 
There was relatively weak evidence for the importance of supply uncertainty in driving 
integration. Integration was found positively associated with mill staffs’ ratings of 
supply uncertainty, but the variable uncert lost significance when forcon was included 
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in the model. The two variables were positively correlated, and it seems likely that 
forest owner concentration is driving both supply uncertainty and integration. Another 
two uncertainty factors were found significant for sawmills only; costprice and 
pricevol. As expected, the cost of price discovery seems to encourage integration. More 
surprisingly, price volatility seems to discourage integration. This may be because 
product prices follow fibre prices and integration (at least in the form of long-term 
contracts) could be a relatively risky option in volatile markets.  
 
The most important drivers of integration seem to be those relating to asset specificity. 
These are factors that lead to less competitive markets for a mill’s fibre needs, 
increased risk for hold-up, and thereby greater incentive to integrate. Fibre specificity, 
the degree to which a mill’s fibre needs are specific to its particular operations, was 
found positively and significantly associated with integration in almost all models 
tested. Similarly, forest owner concentration seems to encourage integration, although 
this factor was not found significant in the sawmill model.  
 
Pulpmills were found more likely to be integrated than sawmills, and this is probably 
due mainly to asset specificity factors; they tend to have much larger scale (and are 
thereby more dependent on the entire supply basin, as defined by transport economics), 
and require much higher capital costs (which increases the risk and cost of hold-up). 
Forest-mill integration also seems to vary by region, whereby mills in Sweden have a 
significantly higher level of integration than those in New Zealand. A very similar set 
of factors seems to influence the integration decision in both regions, but those factors 
do not fully explain why integration is higher in Sweden. One explanation is that non-
TCE factors may also influence the integration decision.  
 
The importance of non-TCE factors 
 
There are indications that non-TCE factors play an important role in fibre-supply 
integration. The differences in New Zealand and Sweden could not be fully explained 
by the variables measured; either an important TCE-related factor is missing or poorly 
measured, or non-TCE factors are responsible (such as the historical development of 
the respective industrial cultures). Non-TCE factors can present the most important 
considerations for the integration decision. In the United States for example, taxation 
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laws favour the REIT13 organisational structure over corporate ownership of 
timberlands, which has encouraged integrated pulp and paper companies to sell or 
separate the ownership of their timberlands. This can even impact forest ownership 
patterns internationally; the American company Rayonier Inc holds timberlands in New 
Zealand, which are included in their “taxable REIT subsidiary” formed in 2003. 
Rayonier divested their wood processing assets in New Zealand in 2005, with the sale 
of the medium density fibreboard mill in Matura.  
 
Furthermore, both the interviews prior to conducting the survey and the survey results 
indicate a range of non-TCE factors are often taken into consideration. The last 
question in the survey was “What other factors influence your organisation’s decision 
on whether to own forest to supply the mill?” The three most common considerations 
were: capital intensity; focus on core business/competencies; risks of forest ownership. 
Over 90% of responses for pulpmills, and around 70% for sawmills, were in these three 
categories. The fourth most common consideration was “soft” factors, such as an 
organisation’s identity and affinity to forest assets. This was almost exclusively 
observed among sawmill respondents, who often also cited considerations of taxation 
and availability of forestland to purchase. In general, it appears that the barriers to 
forest ownership are considered more formidable for sawmill owners, while pulp 
manufacturers are to a greater extent concerned about focusing on their core business. 
 
Research limitations and areas for further research 
 
This is the first study of its kind, with a relatively small sample size and coverage of 
only two regions. Further research is required to gain a clear understanding of TCE’s 
role in fibre-supply integration, and forest ownership in particular. 
 
A limitation of using survey data is that it relies on the accuracy and consistency of the 
participants’ responses. The answers given must depend to some degree on the 
                                                 
13 Real-Estate Investment Trust, a tax designation for a corporation investing in real estate that reduces 
corporate income tax, but requires that at least 75% of assets are real-estate, cash or government 
securities 
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individual participant; they are for example subject to their knowledge and perceptions. 
The accuracy of the objective measures can be quite well-assured, by cross-checking 
against the public information available and by applying some common sense. If the 
responses to the more subjective questions reflect the organisation’s perception, they 
will be useful in explaining that organisation’s integration decisions. However, they 
will be influenced by the individual’s perceptions too. An attempt was made to 
minimize these issues through clear question formulation, good survey design, and 
prior communication with all participants. 
 
Another limitation of this research is the sample size. The quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimation method is best suited to a greater number of observations than this research 
is based on. However, other TCE studies have a similar sample size (Hobbs, 1997, 
Wang and van Kooten, 1998), and a larger sample was beyond the scope of this study. 
The survey process can be very time-consuming (for this research, it took more than six 
months). All participants were contacted personally prior to sending the survey, in 
order to better inform them of the research objectives and process, increase response 
rates, and due to potential negative reactions from mass-distribution of unsolicited 
email. A large and simultaneous distribution of the survey would significantly reduce 
the time required to collect data. Future research could expand the dataset by surveying 
the remaining mills in New Zealand and Sweden, or extending the survey to forest 
industries in other regions, such as Finland, Canada and the United States. 
 
A question that this research raises but does not answer is why the intermediate form of 
integration (long-term contracts) is so common, and why it may be used instead of 
either extreme (forest ownership, or full reliance on the market). By offering a level of 
supply security, while demanding a certain level of commitment, contracts can be 
considered a form of integration. In the analysis presented here, integration was defined 
as the proportion of fibre not coming from the market, because forest ownership was 
found so rare and because long-term contracts appear to be the preferred approach to 
reduce reliance on the market. Future research could explore why contracts are so 
popular for mill fibre supply. It may well be due to pre-existing factors, such as the 
barriers to acquisition of forestland in Sweden, and the legacy of forestland divestments 
by integrated forest product companies in New Zealand.  
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Appendix 1: Data summary tables 
 
Data summary by region 
Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum Variable 
category 
Variable 
Swe. NZ Swe. NZ Swe. NZ Swe. NZ 
fibreo 14.1 12.8 26.0 28.0 0 0 100 95 
fibrec 41.7 28.8 35.8 37.5 0 0 100 100 
Independent 
variable(s) 
fibrem 44.2 58.4 36.4 40.9 0 0 100 100 
size 292.2 111.7 299.3 199.4 18 0 1250 990 Transaction 
frequency mills 2.6 1.6 2.3 1.4 1 1 13 6 
uncert 2.8 3.2 1.4 1.4 1 1 5 5 
pricevol 3.0 2.8 1.0 1.2 1 1 5 5 
costcon 2.2 2.6 1.1 1.3 1 1 5 5 
Uncertainty 
costprice 1.8 1.6 0.8 0.7 1 1 4 3 
forcon 2.8 4.5 1.4 0.8 1 1 5 5 
chipcon 3.4 4.0 1.2 0.0 1 4 5 4 
buycon 4.3 4.4 0.9 0.9 1 2 5 5 
sitesp 3.1 2.8 1.5 1.7 1 1 5 5 
balance 3.1 2.6 1.4 1.4 1 1 5 5 
fibresp 3.0 3.6 1.4 1.2 1 1 5 5 
sp_type 1.2 1.4 0.4 0.7 1 1 2 3 
sp_number 1.8 1.3 0.8 0.6 1 1 4 3 
Asset 
specificity  
grade 1.9 1.8 0.9 0.9 1 1 3 3 
assoc 2.5 2.2 0.7 0.6 1 1 3 3 
formown 2.6 1.6 1.3 0.8 1 1 4 4 
millage 1925 1967 40.8 21.3 1765 1906 2000 2001 
Non-TCE 
factors 
swaps 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.3 1 1 3 2 
 
Data summary by milltype 
Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum Variable 
category 
Variable 
Saw Pulp Saw Pulp Saw Pulp Saw Pulp 
fibreo 12.0 17.1 25.1 29.8 0 0 95 100 
fibrec 33.2 44.7 35.7 38.4 0 0 100 100 
Independent 
variable(s) 
fibrem 54.8 38.1 39.4 34.6 0 0 100 100 
size 89.8 513.4 91.9 325.4 0 34 360 1250 Transaction 
frequency mills 2.1 2.5 2.2 1.9 1 1 13 6 
uncert 3.0 2.9 1.3 1.5 1 1 5 5 
pricevol 3.0 2.8 1.1 1.0 1 1 5 5 
costcon 2.5 2.1 1.2 1.2 1 1 5 5 
Uncertainty 
costprice 1.9 1.5 0.8 0.7 1 1 4 3 
forcon 3.7 2.9 1.4 1.4 1 1 5 5 
chipcon n/a 3.5 n/a 1.1 n/a 1 n/a 5 
buycon 4.3 4.5 0.8 1.0 2 1 5 5 
sitesp 2.7 3.6 1.6 1.5 1 1 5 5 
balance 2.7 3.5 1.2 1.7 1 1 5 5 
fibresp 3.4 2.9 1.3 1.5 1 1 5 5 
sp_type 1.2 1.4 0.5 0.5 1 1 3 2 
sp_number 1.4 2.1 0.5 1.1 1 1 2 4 
Asset 
specificity  
grade 1.7 2.2 0.8 1.0 1 1 3 3 
assoc 2.3 2.6 0.7 0.6 1 1 3 3 
formown 1.7 3.3 0.9 1.0 1 1 4 4 
millage 1948 1925 40.7 34.9 1765 1859 2001 1989 
Non-TCE 
factors 
swaps 1.4 1.5 0.7 0.8 1 1 3 3 
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrices 
 
 
Correlation matrix for Swedish mills 
Scores that are > 0.7 or <-0.7 are shown in bold text. 
 
 
 
Correlation matrix for New Zealand mills 
Scores that are > 0.7 or <-0.7 are shown in bold text. 
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Correlation matrix for sawmills 
Scores that are > 0.7 or <-0.7 are shown in bold text. 
 
 
 
Correlation matrix for pulpmills 
Scores that are > 0.7 or <-0.7 are shown in bold text. 
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Appendix 3: Alternative models 
 
Appendix 3.1: Alternative combined models 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) version of combined model 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t P>|t| 
milltype -0.291 0.111 -2.61 0.01 Dummy variables 
region 0.253 0.091 2.78 0.01 
size 0.000 0.000 1.27 0.21 Transaction 
frequency mills -0.029 0.018 -1.64 0.11 
forcon -0.071 0.031 -2.28 0.03 Asset specificity 
fibresp -0.105 0.028 -3.73 0.00 
- (constant) 1.092 0.125 8.76 0.00 
 
Tobit version of combined model 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t P>|t| 
milltype -0.509 0.175 -2.90 0.01 Dummy variables 
region 0.482 0.146 3.31 0.00 
size 0.000 0.000 1.44 0.15 Transaction 
frequency mills -0.045 0.028 -1.64 0.11 
forcon -0.099 0.049 -2.01 0.05 Asset specificity 
fibresp -0.181 0.046 -3.96 0.00 
- (constant) 1.455 0.204 7.13 0.00 
 
Alternative combined fractional logit model, with variable uncert 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t P>|t| 
milltype -1.477 0.464 -3.180 0.00 Dummy variables 
region 0.605 0.394 1.540 0.12 
size 0.002 0.001 2.550 0.01 Transaction 
frequency mills -0.134 0.072 -1.870 0.06 
Uncertainty uncert -0.362 0.126 -2.860 0.00 
Asset specificity fibresp -0.480 0.147 -3.270 0.00 
Non-TCE factors swaps -0.606 0.261 -2.320 0.02 
- (constant) 3.566 0.639 5.580 0.00 
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Appendix 3.2: Alternative regional models 
 
Alternative Swedish models 
 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Z P>|z| 
Uncertainty uncert -0.333 0.155 -2.140 0.03 
fibresp -0.451 0.171 -2.640 0.01 Asset specificity 
sp_type -0.916 0.528 -1.740 0.08 
- (constant) 3.151 0.812 3.880 0.00 
 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Z P>|z| 
Dummy variable milltype -0.677 0.400 -1.690 0.09 
Uncertainty uncert -0.354 0.158 -2.240 0.03 
Asset specificity fibersp -0.458 0.174 -2.640 0.01 
- (constant) 2.410 0.697 3.460 0.00 
 
 
Alternative New Zealand models 
 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Z P>|z| 
balance -0.605 0.223 -2.720 0.01 
forcon -0.996 0.551 -1.810 0.07 
Asset specificity 
fibresp -0.818 0.284 -2.880 0.00 
- (constant) 9.475 2.898 3.270 0.00 
 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Z P>|z| 
Uncertainty uncert -0.406 0.204 -2.000 0.05 
balance -0.589 0.247 -2.390 0.02 
forcon -1.050 0.534 -1.970 0.05 
Asset specificity 
fibresp -0.898 0.285 -3.150 0.00 
- (constant) 11.276 3.001 3.760 0.00 
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Appendix 3.3: Alternative sawmill and pulpmill models 
 
Alternative sawmills models 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t P>|t| 
Transaction 
frequency 
mills -0.291 0.086 -3.390 0.00 
uncert -0.305 0.145 -2.100 0.04 Uncertainty 
pricevol 0.414 0.194 2.140 0.03 
Asset specificity fibresp -0.551 0.196 -2.810 0.01 
- (constant) 2.370 1.085 2.180 0.03 
 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t P>|t| 
Dummy variable region 0.524 0.586 0.890 0.37 
size -0.004 0.002 -1.790 0.07 Transaction 
frequency mills -0.124 0.079 -1.570 0.12 
pricevol 0.540 0.213 2.540 0.01 Uncertainty 
costprice -0.513 0.368 -1.390 0.16 
Asset specificity fibresp -0.468 0.230 -2.040 0.04 
- (constant) 1.567 1.088 1.440 0.15 
 
Alternative pulpmills models 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t P>|t| 
Dummy variable region 1.598 0.652 2.450 0.01 
Transaction 
frequency 
size 0.002 0.001 2.580 0.01 
Asset specificity forcon -0.714 0.239 -2.990 0.00 
 fibresp -0.513 0.167 -3.080 0.00 
- (constant) 1.679 0.784 2.140 0.03 
 
Variable category Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t P>|t| 
Transaction 
frequency 
size 0.002 0.001 2.610 0.01 
balance -0.372 0.168 -2.220 0.03 Asset specificity 
fibresp -0.628 0.151 -4.160 0.00 
- (constant) 1.576 0.878 1.790 0.07 
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Appendix 4: The surveys 
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Forest-sawmill integration survey
1. Introduction
Welcome to this survey, and thanks for your participation.
The information you provide will be kept confidential. While the results of the study will be made public, it will 
only be a summary of many mill’s responses, where the identity of individual mills will be hidden. 
There are 21 questions - please answer them all to the best of your knowledge. The survey should take 10-
15 minutes. 
2. Mill's log sourcing
The following questions are key to the survey, about what volume of logs the mill consumes, and how they 
are sourced. 
Please provide your participant code here:
1. How much of the mill's annual sawlog consumption is from each of the 
following sources? (please give percent, where total is 100)
From own forests 
(owned by same 
organisation as the mill, 
by share greater than 
50%)
From long-term
contracts (duration 
greater than 1 year)
From other sources (eg 
spot market)
2. Approximately what volume of sawlogs does the mill consume annually 
(please give in thousand cubic meters)
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Forest-sawmill integration survey
3. Number of buyers and sellers
These questions are related to the number of buyers and sellers in the market. If you are unsure of the 
exact answer to any of these questions, please estimate.
The term "fibre basin" is used here and elsewhere throughout the survey. By that I mean within a 120km 
radius of the mill.
3. What share of total productive forest resources in the fibre basin do the top 3 
forest owners control?
nmlkj 0-10%
nmlkj 11-20%
nmlkj 21-40%
nmlkj 41-60%
nmlkj 61-100%
4. What share of total sawlog consumption in the fibre basin do the top three 
consumers use, in a typical year?
nmlkj 0-10%
nmlkj 11-20%
nmlkj 21-40%
nmlkj 41-60%
nmlkj 61-100%
5. What is the supply-demand balance in the fibre basin?
nmlkj Net export of >10% of total sawlog supply
nmlkj Net export of 0-10% of total sawlog supply
nmlkj Net balance of sawlog supply and demand
nmlkj Net import of 0-10% of total sawlog demand
nmlkj Net import of >10% of total sawlog demand
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4. Asset specificity
These questions are regarding the level to which the mill is 'specific' to the resources in the fibre basin, i.e. 
how dependent it is on a specific type of resource. If unsure, please estimate.
Again, by fibre basin I mean within a 120km radius of the mill.
6. How much of the mill’s annual sawlog need is harvested in the fibre basin in a 
typical year?
nmlkj 1-2 times mill’s needs
nmlkj 3-4 times mill’s needs
nmlkj 5-6 times mill’s needs
nmlkj 7-10 times mill’s needs
nmlkj 10+ times mill’s needs
7. Does the organisation/individual that owns the mill own any other sawmills, 
pulp mills, panel mills, or other log-consuming plants within the fibre basin? 
nmlkj No
nmlkj Yes. How many?
8. Which of the following species does the mill use? (please select all that apply)
gfedc Radiata pine
gfedc Douglas fir
gfedc Other
9. How specific to the mill’s operation are the sawlogs the mill consumes (in 
terms of dimensions, wood density, or other physical property)? 
nmlkj 1 (Not at all specific)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Highly specific)
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5. Supply uncertainty
These questions relate to sawlog price volatility and supply uncertainty.
10. How volatile is the price of sawlogs on the open market, in your view?
nmlkj 1 (Not volatile, i.e. stable)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Highly volatile)
11. With what level of certainty could the mill source (at affordable prices) all it’s
sawlog needs from the open market in a given year? 
nmlkj 1 (Highly uncertain)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Very certain / reliable)
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6. Procurement costs
These questions relate to the costs of the mill's procurement operations.
12. How many procurement staff does the mill have working with log supply 
from non-integrated, non-contract sources (eg the spot market)?
13. How do forest owner associations impact the cost of procuring sawlogs in 
your fibre basin? 
nmlkj No forest owner association / no impact
nmlkj Lower costs (eg through coordinated harvesting and marketing)
nmlkj Higher costs (eg by increasing forest owners’ bargaining power)
14. How strong relationships do the mill’s procurement staff tend to have with 
non-integrated, non-contract suppliers?
nmlkj 1 (Very weak)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Very strong)
nmlkj No procurement staff
Page 6
Forest-sawmill integration survey
7. Other factors
These are factors which may or may not have an impact on log sourcing decisions.
15. What is the ownership form of the mill/company?
nmlkj Private, single mill
nmlkj Private, multiple mills
nmlkj Public, single mill
nmlkj Public, multiple mills
16. When was the mill first established? (Please give first year of operation)
17. Which of the following products are manufactured at the mill?
nmlkj Mainly structural-grade lumber (eg for framing, packaging), i.e. at 60%+ 
nmlkj Mainly appearance-grade lumber (eg for furniture), i.e. at 60%+
nmlkj Both structural and appearance grade lumber, i.e. each at 40-60%
18. Does the owner of the mill own forest assets in another region, which can 
be used strategically to improve access to sawlogs in this fiber basin? 
(For example, if sawmill owner #1 has forests in another region that are 
important to a sawmill owner #2, and #2 in turn owns forest assets important to 
#1, the two parties could make log exchanges, or “swaps”)
nmlkj No
nmlkj Yes, to a limited degree
nmlkj Yes, to a significant degree
19. How significant are the costs of monitoring and enforcing log supply 
contracts, in your view?
nmlkj 1 (Not significant)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Very significant)
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8. END OF SURVEY
Thank you very much for participating. You will receive a copy of the research paper on completion (early 
2008).
Any feedback on the survey is gratefully received.
Glen O'Kelly
New Zealand School of Forestry
Canterbury University
glenokelly@hotmail.com
20. How difficult is it to find out what the market price for sawlog is, in your 
view?
nmlkj 1 (Simple / easy)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Very difficult)
21. What other factors influence your organisation’s decision on whether to own 
forest to supply the mill? (You may select several).
gfedc Tax advantages
gfedc Reduced capital intensity
gfedc Focus on core business/competancies
gfedc Risks of forest ownership
gfedc “Soft” factors (eg organisation’s identity and affinity to forest assets)
gfedc Other (please specify)
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Forest-pulpmill integration survey
1. Introduction
Welcome to this survey, and thanks for your participation.
The information you provide will be kept confidential. While the results of the study will be made public, it will 
only be a summary of many mill’s responses, where the identity of individual mills will be hidden. 
There are 20 questions - please answer them all to the best of your knowledge. The survey should take 10-
15 minutes. 
2. Mill's fibre sourcing
The following questions are key to the survey, about what volume of logs and chips the mill consumes, and 
how they are sourced. 
Please provide your participant code here:
1. How much of the mill's annual fibreconsumption is from each of the following 
sources? (please give percent, where total is 100)
Logs, from own forests 
(owned by same 
organisation as the mill, 
by share greater than 
50%)
Logs, from long-term
contracts (duration 
greater than 1 year)
Logs, from other 
sources (eg spot 
market)
Chips & residues, from 
own facilities (eg own 
sawmills)
Chips & residues, from 
long-term contracts 
(duration greater than 1 
year)
Chips & residues, from 
other sources (eg spot 
market)
2. Approximately what volume of fibre does the mill consume annually (please 
give in thousand bone-dry metric tonnes)
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3. Number of buyers and sellers
These questions are related to the number of buyers and sellers in the market. If you are unsure of the 
exact answer to any of these questions, please estimate.
The term "fibre basin" is used here and elsewhere throughout the survey. By that I mean within a 120km 
radius of the mill.
3. What share of total productive forest resources in the fibre basin do the top 3 
forest owners control?
nmlkj 0-10%
nmlkj 11-20%
nmlkj 21-40%
nmlkj 41-60%
nmlkj 61-100%
4. What share of total chip and residue supply in the fibre basin do the top three 
suppliers control?
nmlkj 0-10%
nmlkj 11-20%
nmlkj 21-40%
nmlkj 41-60%
nmlkj 61-100%
5. What share of total pulplog and chip consumption in the fibre basin do the top 
three consumers use, in a typical year?
nmlkj 0-10%
nmlkj 11-20%
nmlkj 21-40%
nmlkj 41-60%
nmlkj 61-100%
6. What is the supply-demand balance in the fibre basin?
nmlkj Net export of >10% of total fibre supply
nmlkj Net export of 0-10% of total fibre supply
nmlkj Net balance of fibre supply and demand
nmlkj Net import of 0-10% of total fibre demand
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4. Asset specificity
These questions are regarding the level to which the mill is 'specific' to the resources in the fibre basin, i.e. 
how dependent it is on a specific type of resource. If unsure, please estimate.
Again, by fibre basin I mean within a 120km radius of the mill.
nmlkj Net import of >10% of total fibre demand
7. How much of the mill’s annual fibre need is harvested in the fibre basin in a 
typical year?
nmlkj 1-2 times mill’s needs
nmlkj 3-4 times mill’s needs
nmlkj 5-6 times mill’s needs
nmlkj 7-10 times mill’s needs
nmlkj 10+ times mill’s needs
8. Does the organisation/individual that owns the mill own any other pulp mills, 
sawmills, panel mills, or other fibre-consuming plants within the fibre basin? 
nmlkj No
nmlkj Yes. How many?
9. Which of the following species does the mill use? (please select all that apply)
gfedc Radiata pine
gfedc Eucalyptus
gfedc Other
10. How specific to the mill’s operation are the logs and chips the mill consumes 
(in terms of dimensions, fibre length, density, or other physical property)? 
nmlkj 1 (Not at all specific)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Highly specific)
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5. Supply uncertainty
These questions relate to fibre price volatility and supply uncertainty.
11. How volatile is the price of pulplogs and chips on the open market, in your 
view?
nmlkj 1 (Not volatile, i.e. stable)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Highly volatile)
12. With what level of certainty could the mill source (at affordable prices) all it’s
fibre needs from the open market in a given year? 
nmlkj 1 (Highly uncertain)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Very certain / reliable)
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6. Procurement costs
These questions relate to the costs of the mill's procurement operations.
13. How many procurement staff does the mill have working with fibre supply 
from non-integrated, non-contract sources (eg the spot market)
14. How do forest owner associations impact the cost of procuring pulplogs in 
your fibre basin? 
nmlkj No forest owner association / no impact
nmlkj Lower costs (eg through coordinated harvesting and marketing)
nmlkj Higher costs (eg by increasing forest owners’ bargaining power)
15. How strong relationships do the mill’s procurement staff tend to have with 
non-integrated, non-contract suppliers?
nmlkj 1 (Very weak)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Very strong)
nmlkj No procurement staff
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7. Other factors
These are factors which may or may not have an impact on log sourcing decisions.
16. When was the mill first established? (Please give first year of operation)
17. Does the owner of the mill own forest assets in another region, which can 
be used strategically to improve access to fibre in this fiber basin? 
(For example, if mill owner #1 has forests in another region that are important 
to a mill owner #2, and #2 in turn owns forest assets important to #1, the two 
parties could make log exchanges, or “swaps”)
nmlkj No
nmlkj Yes, to a limited degree
nmlkj Yes, to a significant degree
18. How significant are the costs of monitoring and enforcing fibre supply 
contracts, in your view?
nmlkj 1 (Not significant)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Very significant)
19. How difficult is it to find out what the market price for fibre is, in your view?
nmlkj 1 (Simple / easy)
nmlkj 2
nmlkj 3
nmlkj 4
nmlkj 5 (Very difficult)
20. What other factors influence your organisation’s decision on whether to own 
forest to supply the mill? (You may select several).
gfedc Tax advantages
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8. END OF SURVEY
Thank you very much for participating. You will receive a copy of the research paper on completion (early 
2008).
Any feedback on the survey is gratefully received.
Glen O'Kelly
New Zealand School of Forestry
Canterbury University
glenokelly@hotmail.com
gfedc Reduced capital intensity
gfedc Focus on core business/competancies
gfedc Risks of forest ownership
gfedc “Soft” factors (eg organisation’s identity and affinity to forest assets)
gfedc Other (please specify)
